Abstract: Since 2013, we have observed an increasing number of failed Russian banks with negative capital and falsified financial reporting. We use previously unavailable data for the period 2010 -1H2015 to develop a logit model predicting the probability of bank failure with negative capital. In order to do so, we suggest solutions for the class imbalance and variable selection problems. The models chosen are confirmed to be robust and have longer forecasting horizons compared to previous research. Also, we implement a novel probability-based approach to the out-of-sample forecasting evaluation which confirms a good fit of the selected models to data. The model predicts bank failures in three quarters and finds 33% of actual failures among 5% of banks with the highest predicted probability to fail (out-of-sample). In addition, we make available previously unpublished banking data for Russia.
Introduction
Over the past several years, there has been a growing interest in assessing the stability of the Russian banking sector. Turmoil caused by the global economic recession in [2008] [2009] and geopolitical issues in 2014-2015 drew much public attention. Since 2010, more and more banks have been failing in Russia with negative capital. This means that the Central Bank of Russia found that the assets of those banks were smaller than their liabilities. Therefore, depositors and other creditors incur losses and pay for the mismanagement in banks. The phenomenon of failed Russian banks with negative capital was previously uncommon and little studied. The majority of papers on the financial stability of Russian banks examine the factors of bank failure in Russia and try to make predictions (see Fungacova and Weill, 2013; Karminsky and Kostrov, 2014; Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2006) . Prior research has some limitations related to the availability of data for analysis. They define default event as a license revocation, due to various reasons, such as an inability to satisfy creditors' claims, capital inadequacy, and money laundering.
In our research, we use bank-specific financial data for the period from 2010 to the first half of 2015 (1H2015) to study the phenomenon of failure with negative capital in Russian banking. In comparison with prior research on default probability (PD) in banking, we adopted a few innovations:
• Introduce the definition of bank failure as a license withdrawal from a bank with negative capital. The Central Bank of Russia has published relevant information since the fourth quarter of 2010 (4q2010), which limits the considered period. Previously, it was impossible to use this clear definition, due to the absence of information. In literature on this topic, it is substituted with less precise analogues, like license revocation, due to some reason (e.g., illiquidity). Many banks that failed with negative capital concealed their poor performance and financial position in the reporting. Therefore, it was initially unclear whether predicting failures with negative capital was possible.
• Apply a forward stepwise selection algorithm from a universe of many candidate covariates to predict bank failures. Hereinafter, we use the terms 'bank failure' and 'bank default' as synonyms to 'bank failure with negative capital'.
• Pay much attention to the presence of class imbalance problem in data and its impact on the estimation procedure and on some standard forecasting power indicators. Also, we suggest an approach to tackle this issue.
• Implement an innovative approach to testing the forecasting power of the created models. Also, we use the permutation test and cross-validation to prove the model adequacy. The constructed models are able to predict the probability of failure quite precisely and separate failed and alive banks.
• Create an adequate model with a longer forecasting horizon of three and four quarters for the probability of bank failure. This is important, because many banks stop publishing their reports short before the failure event. Also, long forecasting horizons enable a potential user of the model to avoid a bank or initiate regulatory measures well in advance.
Also, we examine the consequences of bank failures according to creditor type. Only funds of individuals are guaranteed within a certain insurance limit in Russian banks, which decreases the chances of other bank creditors to recoup money. Using public information provided by the Central Bank of Russia and the Deposit Insurance Agency, we estimate that corporate depositors lose on average about 75% of their funds in the failed banks. Given the present unstable economic circumstances in Russia, the model might be in high demand by bank creditors, including other banks, to estimate their reliability and by the Central Bank of Russia to improve supervisory practices. Our model allows for longer forecasting horizons without degradation in the prediction accuracy. We find that the set of covariates, which are instrumental to make predictions, does depend on the forecasting horizon. Overall, 27 variables are chosen from a universe of 50 candidate predictors at least on one forecasting horizon. Most of them (24 out of 27) have expected signs of coefficients without contradictions across models. The forecasting accuracy is confirmed to be stable under the cross-validation and the permutation test. Using the probability-based approach to forecasting, we show that the predicted default probabilities are close to the empirically observed ones.
An important by-product of this work is the collection and dissemination of data about the Russian banking sector: lists of non-banking credit institutions, members of banking groups, about the ownership structure and bank failures for the period from 2010 to 1H2015. We believe that high informational transparency will facilitate further research on the Russian banking sector.
The paper structure is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature useful to predict the cases of bank failures with negative capital. In Section 3, we characterise the evolution of the Russian banking sector, explaining the prerequisites of the phenomenon of negative capital in banks. Section 4 addresses data and model used. In Section 5, we assess the robustness of a forecasting procedure and discuss the empirical findings. The last section concludes this paper.
Literature review
Our paper unifies two seemingly separate areas of economic literature. The first area of the literature addresses the issue of fraudulent financial reporting in companies. Many Russian banks with negative capital conceal their poor performance and weak financial position. The second area concerns the instability of Russian banks and the withdrawals of banking licenses. Most Russian banks with negative capital lost their licenses, since the owners did not support them.
Literature on the detection of fraudulent financial reporting in companies
At first glance, the ability of any model to detect companies with fraudulent financial reporting is very uncertain. However, there are successful attempts to address this issue. Nor et al. (2010) examine misreporting by non-listed Malaysian companies in 2004. They consider firm size as an important determinant of book-cooking. On the one hand, larger firms could implement better practices of internal control. On the other hand, big companies have strong incentives to hide large profits to optimise taxes and avoid claims by employees and consumers. Using a tobit model, they support the first hypothesis: larger companies are more transparent. Ownership type is another possible determinant of financial misstatement. Inspired by previous research, they assert that higher control concentration facilitates misrepresentation. However, they find no evidence of this. They suggest that the size of the bank's external auditor is important. Larger auditors provide higher-quality services. They also probably reject bribery as a payment 'to get things done'. Lin and Becker (2003) compare a fuzzy neural network and a logit model for the detecting of fraudulent financial statements issued by US publicly traded companies in 1980-1995. Both models exhibit good forecasting power for non-fraudulent cases, while the fuzzy neural network dominates in classifying frauds. Several publicly available financial ratios are used as predictors, which confirms that financial reporting contains indicators of misconduct. The variables employed are specific for non-banking companies, so we omit a detailed discussion here.
Using a dataset almost similar to the previous research, Kaminski et al. (2004) confirm that financial ratios are useful for detecting the misstatements in financial records. Moreover, they emphasise that in 1997, the American Accounting Association encouraged the use of analytical tools by practitioners to improve the detection of fake financial reporting. The set of explanatory financial ratios varies from year to year, but a higher ratio of fixed to total assets significantly increases the probability of misreporting across the whole period. They face a class imbalance problem: few cases of misreporting were available to estimate the model properly in the training set. Garcia et al. (2012) discuss the class imbalance problem and methods to overcome it.
Consistent with prior research, Kirkos et al. (2007) demonstrate that public reporting does contain falsification indicators. Using Greek company statistics, they apply a few financial ratios to forecast falsifications in financial reporting.
Literature on the license revocations from Russian banks
The important evidence in the accounting literature on fraudulent financial reporting is that the explanatory variables for the probability of failure and misreporting partially coincide. Kaminski et al. (2004) note that the ratios useful for fraud detection might transform a fraud detection model into a bankruptcy prediction one. Liou (2008) compares the models for business failure prediction and for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting. Liou proves that there is a set of common explanatory variables that are highly significant in both types of the models. Their findings confirm the common sense: financial distress and poor performance often force the firm's management to issue the fraudulent financial reporting. In this section, we try to outline development process for the Russian banking sector and stress the most important conditions that could lead to the observed phenomenon of negative capital in banks and the overall vulnerability of the Russian banking sector. We identify the periods of the banking system development, as suggested by Karminsky and Kostrov (2014) . (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . In early post-Soviet times, there was economic and political turmoil in Russia that was intensified by weak legislation. The number of banks rose extremely quickly (see Figure A1 in Appendix):
Formation
• entrance barriers were very low, so many players decided to enter a market with promising opportunities for growth
• a lack of trust and security in the young transition economy forced companies to create their own captive banks
• criminals launched banks to launder money and finance illegal activities.
At the end of 2015, there was still a truly abnormal number of banks in Russia, given the size and scale of the national economy: slightly less than 700 banks 1 were operating.
Rapid development (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . During this period, GDP growth rate in Russia fluctuated between 5% and 10%. The banking sector environment improved significantly. Deposit insurance and Basel I compliance requirements were adopted in Russia, and the quality of supervision by the banking regulator was enhanced. Generally, exponential growth was very typical for the Russian economy in [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and the upward trend in the development of the banking sector was very strong. The ratio of bank assets to GDP ratio constituted 68% in 2008 after modest 42% in 2003 (see Figure A2 in Appendix). What partially explains these large growth rates is a low base effect. Meanwhile, the crisis was coming.
Financial crisis (2008) (2009) . This affected the Russian economy much more severely than in other BRICS and CIS countries. Understanding the sources of that crash is crucially important to estimate the stability of the Russian banking sector today. Aleksashenko et al. (2011) suggest the external factors (slump in demand for natural resources exported from Russia, large corporate debt to foreign sector) and internal reasons (regulatory mistakes, overheating of the Russian economy) to explain the deep downturn of the Russian economy. In 2008-2009, authorities rescued several banks that were believed to be systematically important and potential triggers of systemic collapse. Aleksashenko et al. (2011) claim that total expenses on bank sanitations were as large as 1% of Russian GDP. Unlike in developed economies, the ability of the Russian authorities to recoup that money was very low.
Restructuring (since 2010).
After the post-crisis rebound in 2010-2012, the Russian economy slowed down significantly. The Central Bank of Russia adopted a policy to remove tiny, opaque, and poorly performing banks from the banking system. That policy became a core one after the new chief executive Elvira Nabiullina became the head of the Central Bank of Russia in the second half of 2013. The period of her continuing governance is often called 'cleaning up' the Russian banking sector. An important feature of that period is the increase in the number of closed banks with negative bank capital. Moreover, in many cases, banks concealed weak financial positions in their financial reporting. In this section, we show that bank failures since 2010 have led to larger and more frequent losses for bank creditors. This observation serves as an important motivation to write the present research paper.
In 2014-2015, an oil price shock and geopolitical pressure on Russia (banks lost access to borrowing from abroad as a result of anti-Russian sanctions) threatened the stability of the banking sector. At the beginning of 2015, CMASF, an independent Russian forecasting agency, warned about the re-accumulation of risks in the Russian banking sector (Mamonov and Solntsev, 2015) . In March 2015, the deputy chairperson at the Central Bank of Russia announced that 183 banks submitted their financial reporting to the banking regulator on a daily basis, which was applicable for unstable banks only. CMASF underlined that 'negative capital' would probably appear in many banks.
As we have already outlined, there are still many banks in Russia, in spite of attempts to 'clean up' the banking sector. In this section, we discuss the official procedure of banking supervision in Russia. That is quite important to understand the mechanics of ongoing 'clean up' in the banking and relevant efforts of the Central Bank of Russia.
Banking supervision in Russia
Banking in Russia is regulated by Federal law, in conjunction with a number of acts and instructions. The agency responsible for supervision over the national banking sector is the Central Bank of Russia. Supervision relies on banking data collection, remote monitoring, and regular field inspections. In the next paragraphs, we describe these three activities.
Banking data collection. The Instruction of the Central Bank of Russia number 2332-U entitled "On the List, Forms and the Procedure for the Compilation and Presentation of Financial Reports by Credit Institutions to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation", defines the mandatory information that banks are required to submit to the regulator. That information covers many aspects of the banking business (Table 1 spells out the most important fields that are either public or, in most cases, accessible). Table 2 ). The output of a field inspection is a document that combines the description of the bank's violations and the relevant recommendations formulated by every inspector. Based on that information, chairs of the Central Bank of Russia may:
• fine a bank for violations
• recommend to eliminate violations and monitor a bank's further activities
• appoint a temporary administration in a bank (for several months or years)
• sanitise a bank (provide funds to support the bank's financial position)
• withdraw a bank license.
In some cases, the Central Bank of Russia may apply the penalties stated above, directly using the results of remote monitoring without field inspection.
The scale of the disaster
As Figure 1(a) and (b) show, there is a large surge, both in the number of failed banks and the amount of negative capital in the Russian banking system. In general, a banking license withdrawal does not necessarily imply that bank capital is negative. Sometimes banks stop operating voluntarily (e.g., due to mergers and acquisitions or to exiting the market) or because of legal reasons without financial vulnerability. A list of failed banks with an official motivation for license revocations is available on the website of the Central Bank of Russia. In most cases, bank capital becomes negative when liabilities exceed assets, due to the loss of assets value. When asset value declines, a bank capital absorbs losses, since the bank owners are responsible for the financial result. However, their responsibility is limited by the size of bank capital. When bank capital is found to be exhausted and owners do not provide funds to rescue the bank, the next step is license revocation or sanitation. In the latter case, the Deposit Insurance Agency or another bank gains control over the unstable one in exchange for financial assistance. Often, a bank is officially closed (loses its license), due to the reasons purely unrelated to low capital adequacy (e.g., money laundering). Nevertheless, after the detailed consideration, its capital is found to be negative. An important remark is that many banks with negative capital conceal their poor performance and falsify financial reporting. However, field inspectors from the Central Bank of Russia are able to reveal that some portion of bank assets no longer exists, leading to negative capital. Since 4q2010, the Central Bank of Russia provides information about all cases of bank failures with negative capital in its journal Bank of Russia Bulletin. They reflect the amount of negative capital in failed banks. When the loss in assets value is so large that bank capital is completely exhausted, bank creditors incur losses. In 4q2010-2015, banks with negative capital generated a loss of RUB 382 billion for bank clients. Bank creditors incur losses unequally, since the Federal Law defines the order of precedence for claimants on remaining bank's assets. We estimate that, over the considered period, corporate depositors lost about 75% of funds on their accounts in failed banks with negative capital. In spite of the highest priority among claimants on bank assets, even the Deposit Insurance Agency, which redeems money to individuals within a certain insurance limit, failed to recoup 25% of its insurance payments to individual depositors. The regulator's reports also show the sources of negative capital formation for failed banks, when fake reporting is present (see Figure 2 ). The largest portion of asset value loss for such banks is due to negative re-evaluation of the loan portfolio value. This means that the banks issued loans to unreliable or even non-existing borrowers, and those funds would never be repaid.
In light of the negative economic trends in Russia, 'cleaning up' the national banking sector and the increasing losses from failed banks with negative capital, the financial community needs a model to forecast bank failures in advance. That model could also be useful for bank counterparties and the Central Bank of Russia to spot vulnerable and poorly performing institutions.
Data and model

Data collection and cleaning
Financial bank-specific statistics. Table 1 provides the original sources of financial data for Russian banks. Although available, public reports (rows 6-10 of the table) are mainly disseminated by banks through corporate websites, often in PDF format. In addition, they are not always comparable, since banks apply different accounting policies. The Central Bank of Russia organises the collection and dissemination of reports 1-5 (see Table 1 ) in a standardised format (published on the regulator's website). In its Letters 17-T, 72-T, and 165-T, the Central Bank of Russia recommends banks to permit the publication of reports 1-5, so most banks follow those guidelines. Aggregating information from these reports, intermediaries create the databases of meaningful financial variables for Russian banks. In our paper, we used variables from the database 'Banks and Finance', issued by the information agency Mobile (available in the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia). Table A1 in Appendix contains stock variables (measured at a moment in time); all of them are reported on a monthly basis. First, we remove few observations with obvious typos and mistakes from the database (e.g., observations with negative assets). Then, we fill gaps in data no larger than 6 months for every individual bank, using linear interpolation. As you can see in Table A1 , about 1% of observations are affected by this modification for most variables. Bank-specific flow variables, measured for a period of time, are provided in Table A2 . We aggregate them with the periods of 6 and 12 months (e.g., earnings for the preceding 6 months). Ratios based on financial variables from Tables A1 and A2 are more informative to characterise bank financial position and efficiency, since they are scaled and have clear economic interpretation (see Table A3 ).
Non-financial bank-specific information. We believe that our significant contribution is in collecting and disseminating data on the default cases, ownership structure of Russian banks and non-banking credit organisations in the banking sector.
2
In line with the definition by Mamonov and Vernikov (2015) , the 50-plus-one-share package of a state-controlled bank is controlled by the state directly or through statecontrolled companies. The Central Bank of Russia provides a list of banks that are 100% foreign-controlled. That list is simultaneously misleading and incomplete. First, Russians own and run some banks in that list from abroad. Second, many captive banks of foreign industrial companies operate in Russia without any specific competencies in banking. Third, some subsidiary banks of the international banking corporations are partially owned by foreigners (e.g., Societe Generale Group holds approximately 99% in Rosbank, currently). According to our definition of a foreign bank, a foreign banking corporation holds an over 50% share in its capital.
Data cleaning. An application of almost any binary choice model for making predictions implies estimating it on a training set and testing its forecasting power on another set. The out-of-sample performance of the model is heavily dependent on the quality of the training set. If the classes are weakly separable in the training set, the model will probably be poorly estimated, and its forecasting power will be below the expected level. Consequently, we try to remove the observations that create noise in the training set.
First, we treat the cases of bank sanitation as failures with negative capital. Most of such banks had negative capital and corresponding financial ratios but were supported by the state. It is hardly possible to predict if any particular bank, in case of poor performance, will be closed with negative capital or rescued by the Deposit Insurance Agency and the Central Bank of Russia, which organise and partially finance bank sanitations. The answer depends on many factors, such as the their opinion regarding a bank's systematic importance, the scale of financial distress, and the presence of co-investors to support it. This issue is beyond the scope of our paper and needs further consideration. Second, we remove the observations for foreign banks as defined above. They have access to the best practices and the support from the mother foreign bank to avoid negative capital. The Central Bank of Russia successfully precludes the reverse possible impact on the bank in Russia from abroad. Third, we remove the banks with significant state participation in their capital. Those banks are stable, no matter what happens to their financial results and assets. They operate in a specific environment, where bank failures are almost impossible.
The model
We use logistic regression to predict bank failures with negative capital. The binary response variable for the bank i at time t is y i,t = { 1, if the bank i failed with negative capital in quarter t 0, otherwise .
We consider y i,t as a realisation of a Bernoulli-distributed random variable that can take values 1 and 0 with probabilities π i,t and 1 − π i,t respectively. Using pooled data, we predict the probability of failure with negative capital for the bank i at quarter t given information at time t − n as
where x i,t−n is a column vector with unity as the first entry and N predictors (N + 1 elements overall), characterising bank's i financial conditions n quarter before time t β is a column vector of N + 1 coefficients.
Parameter n also defines the forecasting horizon of the model. The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) method implemented by maximising the likelihood (or, equivalently, the log-likelihood LL) to observe the outcomes we have in the dataset, that is, a collection of increments from every observation (see Statement 3).
where '·' stands for vector multiplication X is a T × (N + 1) matrix of N explanatory variables with T observations for each of them and the first column of ones i -a column vector of ones with T elements y -a column vector of outcomes for T observations of bank performance.
We use 16 quarters of data for the period 2010-2013 as an estimation sample. Using the logit model, we predict the probability of bank failure with negative capital in 1-4 quarters (forecasting horizon, FH). In each case, we address the class imbalance problem and implement a variable selection algorithm that we now describe.
Variable selection algorithm. In this paper, we apply a forward stepwise search algorithm using a universe of 50 possible predictors. Starting with an intercept-only model, we follow these steps:
• Step 1. For the current restricted (R) model, we estimate a family of unrestricted (UR) models, each with one additional 'candidate' predictor not previously included in the model.
•
Step 2. Using a likelihood ratio (LR) test, we select the UR model for which the H 0 hypothesis (see Statement 4) is rejected with the smallest p-value.
H 0 : competing models are equal; UR is not better that R,
• Step 3. If the p-value obtained in
Step 2 is smaller than 5%, and all the coefficients in the corresponding UR model are significant at the same significance level, then we declare this UR model as the new restricted one and return to Step 1. If ether of these two conditions is violated, then the search process is terminated.
Class imbalance problem. In our research, we face a class imbalance problem in the dataset: we have few cases of bank failures with negative capital and many more 'alive' class observations. We formally demonstrate the consequences of the class imbalance problem. By default, every observation has the same weight in the LL function (see Statement 3). Since one class is rare, the model could underestimate its importance, which will deteriorate its forecasting power for bank failures. Increasing weights of the rare class observations in the log-likelihood function is a possible remedy. Statement 5 is the modified version of Statement 3, in which we assign a multiplier (higher weight) m > 1 to failure-class observations, i.e. w j = m, if y j = 1 and w j = 1, otherwise, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
where: '⊙' stands for element-wise multiplication (Hadamard product) w is a column vector of weights for T observations. By default (Statement 3), all observations are equally weighted, w i = 1 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , T }.
Model estimation. We estimate models with a forecasting horizon from 1 to 4 quarters with multiplier m varying from 1 to 200 for failure type observations to smooth the class imbalance problem. In every case, we select predictors out of 50 candidates. As we increase m, the importance of failure-type observation rises, and the algorithm selects more covariates to make more accurate predictions for the failure-class observations. However, very high values of m lead to over-education with resultant deterioration in the out-ofsample performance. So, for every forecasting horizon (1-4 quarters), we select the optimal value for the multiplier (see Tables A4-A7 in Appendix). The selection of the model for every forecasting horizon is based on the model adequacy, the availability of data mainly for failure-type observations, and the preliminary analysis of its forecasting power.
Forecasting power indicators
Esarey and Pierce (2012) provide a thorough discussion of criteria to estimate the prediction accuracy (both in-sample and out-of-sample) of the logit model in the case of highly unbalanced classes of observations: we have less than 150 observations for failed banks and about 18,000 for operating ones. They explain the use of complementary classification-based, probability-based, and likelihood-based indicators to evaluate the forecasting performance of the logit model.
Classification-based approach. Classical classification-based indicators show if the model is able to separate failed from operating banks. In the case of perfect classification, the model predicts defaults (ŷ i,t = 1) for actually failed banks (y i,t = 1) and alive state (ŷ i,t = 0) for others (y i,t = 0). From the practical point of view, a perfectly separating model helps its potential user to avoid eventual failures among banks. Banks with the predicted default probability (π i,t ) above a certain threshold are forecast to fail. Once the threshold is set, we calculate the elements of confusion matrix (see Table 3 ). Based on those elements, a number of measures can be created, such as sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy. Values in the matrix heavily depend on the value of the threshold level. The ROC curve, which plots sensitivity against specificity for every possible threshold level, is a standard tool to address this issue. AUR -area under the ROC curve, is instrumental to evaluate classification accuracy of the model independently on the threshold level. One more limitation occurs, due to the class imbalance in our dataset. Since the bank failures are rare, FP and TP are always very small in comparison with TN and FN. Consequently, some indicators are misleading, e.g., accuracy indicates almost-perfect forecasting power, no matter how the model predicts bank failures. Moreover, the share of correctly predicted failures cannot be compared to 50% (coin flipping), since we are searching for a needle in a haystack: we predict failures, suspecting a small number of banks (ones with high PD) in a large population of banks. Table 3 Two-by-two matrix classifying the prediction outcomes (confusion matrix). In classification-based approach to forecasting, we classify observations with predicted default probability above a certain threshold as 'Failure'
Actual outcome Predicted outcome
Alive state (y = 0)
The number of true negative The number of false positive outcomes, TN outcomes, FP (Type I errors)
The number of false negative The number of true outcomes, FN (Type II errors) positive outcomes, TP Also, we introduce an intuitive indicator of the classification accuracy:
• WithinX%: The number of actual bank failure cases among X% of observations with the highest predicted default probability, in (100 − X)% quantile.
Probability-based approach. Comparison of the fitted and actual outcomes is a standard tool to estimate the model quality in regression analysis. However, in the case of bank default probabilities, the actual probability of failure is unobserved. We can only compare the predicted default probability with the observed empirical average. To make the comparison, we should take the following steps:
• sort observations in ascending order by the predicted default probability
• create bins of observations with relatively homogeneous default probability
• compare the average predicted default probability with the empirical average for each bin.
Good coincidence between the empirical and predicted probabilities confirms that the regression specification used is close to the data-generating process. From the practitioner's point of view, accurate estimation of the probability of default is important, since it is a key parameter in many risk models and reflects the risk of carrying business with a bank.
Likelihood-based approach, used in-sample. Assuming that the model is correctly specified, we can calculate the likelihood of observing the outcomes we actually have in the dataset. AIC and BIC (a more conservative one) information criteria are based on likelihood with penalty for the use of additional covariates in the model.
where n: number of observations k: the number of estimated parameters LL: the maximised value of log-likelihood function.
McFadden's R squared, R 2
McF , compares the prediction obtained with the forecast by the intercept-only model in terms of likelihood. Although it is possible to compare the models using the likelihood-based indicators, it is important to check the assumption of the correct specification first.
Selection of the best predictors
For each model we make a preliminary consideration of its out-of-sample forecasting power on 7 quarters of data from 2014 to 1H2015. During this period, 86 events of bank failures occurred in the Russian banking sector.
We have selected models with the best performance for each forecasting horizon (see Table 4 ). For longer forecasting horizons, the number of failure-type observations present in the dataset is larger: 43 failure-type observations for the forecasting horizon of 1 quarter (see line 'NfailOS' in table) in comparison with 62 for the forecasting horizon of 2 quarters. Often, failed banks with negative capital stop reporting short before the failure event. Next, we provide economic interpretation and expected correlation with the probability of bank failure for variables that survived the variable selection and appeared in final models without contradictions in the signs of coefficients: for 24 out of 27 variables our results are stable.
Description of the predictors
• EQ_A, Capital adequacy ratio. Capital adequacy is computed as the ratio of capital to assets. Negative capital in the case of fair reporting implies a negative capital adequacy ratio. We expect a negative correlation of this predictor with the probability of bank failure with negative capital.
• AFC_A, Share of assets in foreign currencies. Although bank open currency positions are regulated, we expect that a large share of foreign currency denominated assets supports bank stability. The Russian ruble is quite volatile, which could harm the institutes.
• NWA_A, Share of non-working assets in assets. Non-working assets do not generate income directly and often need maintenance. So banks with large shares of non-working assets are probably less stable in case of financial distress. We expect a positive correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• RES_A, Ratio of bad loan reserves to assets. This ratio characterises the quality of the bank's loan portfolio and assets. A large share of bad loan reserves to assets signals poor risk-management or aggressive strategy. Thus, we expect a positive correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• L_37_LP, Share of loan portfolio due in over 36 months. Long-term loans are usually collateralised and relatively profitable. We expect a negative correlation of this variable with the probability of bank failure.
• BF_13_BF, Share of borrowed funds due in over 12 months. Smaller short-term outflow of funds to creditors supports the bank's financial position. Such a bank may expand its investment horizon. Moreover, we can assume that the ability to raise long-term funding is a sign of trust to this bank among market participants. We expect a negative correlation of this variable with the probability of bank failure.
• DI_13_DI, Share of deposits of individuals due in over 12 months. The reasoning is the same as for variable BF_13_BF, with negative expected influence on the probability of failure.
• DC_BF (FC_BF), Share of deposits (funds) of companies in borrowed funds. We believe that companies are more selective with banks. Their funds are not guaranteed by the deposit insurance in Russia. We expect a negative correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• PDU_A, Ratio of payment orders unpaid in time to assets. Large amounts of unpaid orders are a possible sign of a bank's inability to carry out transactions, which increases the probability of bank failure.
• CACB_A, Ratio of funds on corresponding accounts in the Central Bank of Russia to assets. Banks do not earn interest on funds on accounts in the Central Bank of Russia.
In the short-run, high CACB_A ratio confirms a bank's ability to process payments. We expect that banks with higher CACB_A ratio have smaller probability of failure.
• REVFXT_ OREV_12m, Share of revenues from FX trading in operating revenue, for the previous 12 months. FX trading is a risky activity that is different from classical banking operations. We expect a positive correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• INTEXPBI_DI_6m, Cost of deposits from individuals, for the previous 6 months. Banks could increase an interest rate on deposits from individuals to compensate for the lack of other sources of funding. Individuals are insured by the deposit insurance system and do not bother much about safety of their funds in banks. We expect that banks with expensive deposits from individuals have higher probability of failure.
• INTREVLI_LI_6m, Returns from loans to individuals, for the previous 6 months. High returns from loans to individuals often correspond to risky segments of the credit market. We expect a negative correlation with the probability of failure.
• LI_A, Share of loans to individuals in assets. High share of loans to individuals in assets is typical for retail banks. So we introduce this ratio as a control variable for the market strategy of a bank.
• DI_BF, Share of deposits of individuals in borrowed funds. On the one hand, borrowing from individuals is relatively cheap. On the other hand, large exposure to deposits of individuals makes a bank vulnerable to bank runs. Also, very often, individuals do not monitor a bank performance, since their funds are covered by the deposit insurance. Some banks may exploit this opportunity to collect money.
• LI_13_LA, Ratio of loans to individuals due in over 12 months to liquid assets. Long-term loans to individuals are not very liquid. A large value of this ratio corresponds to a moderate amount of liquid funds in a bank that issues long-term loans to individuals. We expect a positive correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• BLI_BL, Share of bad loans to individuals in bad loans. Bad quality of a loan portfolio is a sign of problems with credit risk management in a bank or aggressive strategy. Attempts to collect debts from individuals are more expensive, time-consuming and hopeless, in comparison with companies' overdue loans. We expect a positive correlation of this factor with the probability of bank failure.
• FPC_BF, Share of funds on payment cards in borrowed funds. From the viewpoint of a bank client, it is less profitable to keep much money on payment cards. With a few exceptions, payment cards are not interest-bearing. Moreover, interest rates on deposits are almost always larger. Large share of funds on payment cards could result from money laundering schemes in a bank. We expect a positive correlation with the probability of bank failure in this case.
• TCA_A_6m and TCA_A_12m, Ratio of turnover of funds on corresponding accounts in the Central Bank to assets, for the previous 6 months and 12 months. Low turnover of funds on corresponding accounts in the Central Bank of Russia is a strong indicator of the slowing down of banking business, fewer processed transactions, or even inability to satisfy payment orders. We expect a negative effect of this variable on the probability of bank failure. At the same time, a very high turnover on corresponding accounts could result from panic among bank clients.
• FT_A, Ratio of funds in transactions to assets. High ratio FT_A is a sign that payment processing is working in a bank. So we expect a negative correlation with the probability of bank failure.
• OMARG_6m, Net operating margin of assets, for the previous 12 months. Banks generating low or even negative net operating margin are not profitable and normally cannot operate in the long run. A positive correlation with the probability of bank failure is expected.
Comments on the results. For the discussed variables, our expectations are consistent with the derived results. However, there are some exceptions. Larger share of loans to individuals in assets LI_A tends to decrease the probability of bank failure with negative capital. Loans to individuals are well-documented, smaller in size, numerous, and collateralised for most relatively large loans. In comparison with loans to corporates, loans to individuals are more transparent and have higher resistance to abrupt loss of value. At the same time, a ratio LI_LP tends to increase the probability of bank failure for the model with a forecasting horizon of two quarters. According to our results, a large share of deposits from individuals in borrowed funds DI_BF leads to a higher probability of bank failure with negative capital. It is possible that banks suffer from the 'bank runs' of individual depositors. Also, those banks could increase borrowing from reckless individuals (insured by the Deposit Insurance Agency) or replace the shrinking sources of funding when they approach the failure event.
Notably, a bank size was not significant to predict failures. It means that there are no 'too big to fail' banks in Russia. This result is consistent with Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) , who find no evidence for the relevance of bank size to predict bank failures on a forecasting horizon 1-4 quarters. In contrast, Fungacova and Weill (2013) claim that an effect of bank size on the bank PD is negative. However, they considered a limited universe of less than 10 candidate predictors.
Figure 3 compares in-sample prediction (fitted values) for the probability of bank failure with empirical PD for the selected models. As we can see, these probabilities are very close in most bins, which indicates the model's adequacy and good fit of the model to data. Finally, we use a permutation test to check that the model out-of-sample performance is not obtained purely by chance (spurious). We obtain the distribution of features we are interested in under the H 0 hypothesis (see Statement 8). First, by randomly permuting the elements of vector y, both in-sample and out-of sample, we make the output of the model accidental. Second, we estimate the model and calculate the features of interest.
These two steps are repeated 199 times. P -values are calculated according to MacKinnon (2006):
where I: indicator function with value 1, when its argument is true and 0 otherwise B: a number of iterations in permutation test τ : a test statistics.
In other words, if we obtain a rare result under the null hypothesis, we reject it and consider the model's characteristics as non-random and significant. As we can see in Table 4 , most indicators are significant at the significance level of 1%.
Key findings and robustness of the forecasting procedure
In this paper, we have applied a probability-based approach to analyse the model's out-of sample forecasting power. As described in Section 4, we compared average predicted and empirical average default probabilities for the bins of out-of-sample observations. We have carried out cross-validation for the selected models in order to verify their forecasting power. We now explain in detail our approach for the cross-validation for the model with a forecasting horizon of 1 quarter. The initial training set for the period from 2010 to 2013 contains 6050 observations, including 24 failure-type cases (see Table 4 ). The remaining 2662 observations with 43 bank failures for the period 2014-1H2015 are left to test the forecasting power of the model.
• Step 1. We randomly create a dataset to estimate the model with the same specification as the initial one. The estimation sample contains random 24 failure-type observations out of 67 = 24 + 43 cases and 6026 = 6050 − 24 observations for operating banks out of 8645 = 6050 − 24 + 2662 − 43 available for the period 2010-1H2015.
• Step 2. Observations previously unselected for the estimation set, are used to evaluate a forecast accuracy of the model and corresponding indicators.
• Step 3. Steps 1-2 are repeated 199 times. For every indicator, we calculated mean and standard deviation. Table 5 contains the cross-validation results and confirms a high prediction power for the model. For some indicators, mean results under cross-validation were even better than initial estimation. As we can see in Figure 4 , empirical average probability of bank failure is usually close to the average predicted one. The bins are sorted by the predicted probability to fail in ascending order. The same pattern is evident in the empirical average probability.
Our model allows for a longer forecasting horizon up to 3 quarters without degradation in the model performance. So, in Lanine and Vander Vennet (2006) and Fungacova and Weill (2013) , the forecasting performance deteriorates as they increase the horizon from 1 to 4 quarters. Karminsky and Kostrov (2014) declare that the use of longer forecasting horizons decreases the model quality. In prior research, they used a very limited or fixed set of candidate predictors that could explain the tendency observed. features are 'NobsOS' -the number of observations out-of sample, 'Within 1%', 'Within 5%', and 'Within 10%' -the number of actual bank failure cases among 1%, 5%, and 10% of observations (out-of-sample) respectively with the highest predicted default probability; 'pp-val.' shows p-value for the indicator in permutation test. There exist few references with which to compare the forecasting power, since previous research studied another period in the evolution of the Russian banking sector. In addition, the probability-based approach to evaluating the accuracy of default probability forecasts has not been, to our knowledge, previously used in the field. With a significant number of type II errors and only 30 failure-type observations in the forecasting set, Karminsky and Kostrov (2014) forecast 60% of banking license revocations in 2011-2012, which is different from bank failure with negative capital in 2014-1H2015. We accurately forecast the probability of bank failure with negative capital. Although the classification between failed and operations banks was not the primary purpose of this paper, for the model with a forecasting horizon of three quarters, we find 33% (17 out of 52) of actually failed banks among 5% of banks with the highest predicted probability to fail with negative capital and 42% (22 out of 52) of actually failed banks among 10% of banks with the highest PD. Also, we have suggested a set of useful predictors to forecast the probability of bank failures with negative capital. As we can see, the set of covariates that are instrumental to make predictions does depend on the forecasting horizon.
Conclusion
We studied the phenomenon of bank failure with negative capital in Russia in 2010-1H2015, previously rarely studied, and introduce a model to predict such cases.
We have implemented a few innovations at the time of developing the model. First, we have introduced a definition of bank failure as a license revocation from a bank with negative capital. In prior research, this was impossible, due to the absence of necessary information. Second, we consider the impact of the class imbalance problem in data on the estimation procedure and the forecasting performance of the model, and we solve this problem. Third, we apply a forward stepwise variable selection algorithm from a universe of 50 candidate predictors. Finally, we implement a novel probability-based approach to testing the forecasting power of the suggested model. We have selected and interpreted predictors for the model, which exhibits good forecasting performance with horizon of up to three quarters. The model accurately forecasts the probability of bank failure with negative capital and classifies failed and operating banks: we find 33% of actually failed banks among 5% of banks with the highest predicted probability to fail with negative capital. The robustness of the model is confirmed by a permutation test and cross-validation.
Also, we make available previously unpublished data about Russian banks. We believe this research paper may be applied by the Central Bank of Russia to improve supervision and by practitioners in risk-management.
Notes
1 Hereafter, we distinguish between banks and non-banking credit institutions in Russia. The latter are primarily focused on cash and settlement services and payment processing. 2 We hope this will facilitate further research on the Russian banking sector. See online support materials to this paper at "https://sites.google.com/site/kostrovalexanderv/publications". The datasets collected are full and correct to the best of our knowledge. We used open sources to collect information (such as descriptions of banks on the websites cbr.ru, banki.ru, and allbanks.ru, in daily news, etc.) 
